Reform of Art and Poetry in the Laws Plato
Praxis Filosófica
Print version ISSN 0120-4688 On-line version ISSN 2389-9387
Prax. filos. no.43 Cali July/Dec. 2016
PLATO ON THE POLITICAL Function OF POETRY. THE EXPULSION OF THE TRADITIONAL POETS AND THE REFORM OF Poetry El rol político de la poesía en Platón. La expulsión de los poetas tradicionales y la reforma de la poesía Laura Liliana Gómez Espíndola Recibido: junio 01 de 2016 Abstract Plato offers two criticisms of imitative poetry in the Republic. In the commencement one, developed in books Two and Three, Plato seems to criticize poetry softly, banning just one part of imitative poetry. The 2d criticism, developed in book 10, seems to institute a more drastic critique to imitative poetry that precludes the possibility of whatever kind of imitative poetry in the polis. Many different interpretations take been proposed in order to account for this apparent clash. I volition defend Tate's classical interpretation, according to which no disharmonism exists considering Plato distinguishes two kinds of imitations, and he remains consistent in preserving one and banishing the other. Keywords: poetry; faux; education; virtue; polis. Resumen Platón realiza dos críticas a la poesía imitativa en la República. En la primera, establecida en los libros Two y III, Platón parece criticar suavemente la poesía prohibiendo solamente una parte de la poesía imitativa. La segunda crítica, desarrollada en el libro X, parece establecer una crítica más drástica a la poesía imitativa que elimina la posibilidad de cualquier tipo de poesía imitativa en la polis. Se han propuesto muchas interpretaciones diferentes para explicar este aparente conflicto. Defenderé la interpretación clásica de Tate, de acuerdo con la cual no hay un conflicto aquí porque Platón distingue dos tipos de imitación y es siempre consistente preservando una de ellas y desterrando la otra. Palabras clave: poesía; imitación; educación; virtud; polis. Plato's hostile mental attitude towards classical poesy on the building of his ideal urban center has been long studied and criticized. Information technology has been said that it seems unbelievable that a consummate literary artist, so familiar to poetry and so addicted of it as Plato was could be his enemy1. For this reason, some interpreters take been trying to produce an interpretation of the Republic that could allow us to defend a fiddling more sympathetic attitude toward verse. On the course of these interpretations, there has been a central fence, which is the framework of this paper. Plato does ii critical approaches to imitative poetry on this dialogue. The first i is developed in the books II and Three, where it seems to be that Plato criticizes poetry softly banding merely one part of imitative poetry and preserving the poetry that just imitates virtuous actions. The second critical arroyo is developed on the book x, where information technology seems that Plato establishes a more drastic critique to imitative verse that precludes the possibility of any kind of imitative poetry in the city. So there seems to be a disharmonism between these two Platonic approaches to poetry. There accept been many different explanations of this apparent clash and the debate almost which of these interpretations is correct is still open nowadays. We tin can classify these interpretations in ii main groups (i) some consider that this clash reveals disunity in Plato's idea on the subject of imitation2, (ii) others defend that in that location is not a real disharmonism betwixt those approaches. The defenders of this 2d possibility have developed many dissimilar strategies to defend the unity of Plato'due south idea on this bailiwick and, in outcome, have developed different interpretations. I can discover 3 main readings: (ii.a) Plato preserves all the imitative poetry3; (ii.b) Plato bands all the imitative poesy4; (ii.c) Plato distinguishes 2 kinds of imitations, preserves ane and banishes the other5. In this paper I will defend the final reading (ii.c), trying to bring new arguments both to comprehend it and to carelessness the other interpretations. In social club to achieve this goal, this paper will be divided into three parts. In the offset one, I volition analyze the end of the polis and the function of pedagogy in order to defend the primal function of poesy. The second role will be focused on the critique to imitative poesy adult by Plato on the volume x, in guild to show that this critique is not directed to qualities inherent to imitative poetry, but instead it is addressed to the classics poets who, based on their ignorance, have created a dangerous kind of poetry. The 3rd part will be focused on the reform of poetry proposed by Plato on the books ii and iii. I volition show at that place the consummate agreement between the two ideal approaches to imitative poetry. The end of the polis and the role of education According to the ideal partition of the goods, there are iii kinds of appurtenances that human beings use to pursue: the external goods, the goods of the body and the internal goods of human being soul. Contrary to the opinions of his own interlocutors and of grade opposed to the beliefs of the majority of our ain interlocutors, Plato argues in his Republic that the least important appurtenances are the external ones composed by the multitude of material possessions that people are commonly devoted to achieve. In the 2d place, he locates the goods related to our own trunk, mainly physical health. And in the identify of honour, he locates the goods of the soul, in other words the four cardinal virtues of justice, wisdom, temperance and backbone, which together are called the complete virtue and ascertain a healthy human soul (444c-due east). Information technology is thank you to the possession of this most important good that a human being existence can be considered truly happy. In accord with this bureaucracy, he proposes that the finish that must be mainly pursued by individual human beings is their own happiness, the wellness of their own soul. In the same mode, the goal that must be pursued by the statesman is the happiness of the complete city, the virtue of each individual denizen together with the correct functioning of the political system, in which each denizen performs virtuously his own part (420 b-c). All the legislation must be established with this goal in mind and must be evaluated with reference to its contribution to achieve it. To understand this amend, let me briefly call up the platonic conception of the human being soul and human virtue, which he pictured through the image of the Platonic City. This city, he says, is composed past three different kinds of people: the rulers, whose function is to deliberate and determine, based upon the noesis of what is all-time for the metropolis, how the entire city should be managed; the guardians or the auxiliary class, whose role is to assist the rulers, and then that the law which they have established be followed throughout the city; and the lowest and largest class of the urban center is that of the farmers and other craftsmen, whose function is the production of the means required to the subsistence in a complete obedience to the law. In this city, Plato sketches the four cardinal virtues: the ruling part embodies the virtue of wisdom; the guardians, that of courage; and the lower class, temperance, which is defined as the obedience to the part that by nature rules on behalf of the part that by nature must be guided. The virtue of justice is understood every bit the consummate harmony of the three classes of the city, where each part fulfills its functions and does non intend to become beyond it. If either part exceeds its functions, justice is destroyed and the city is led to its decline. Co-ordinate with the proposal that he defends in the fourth volume of the Democracy, the human being soul is constituted by three parts equivalent to the three parts of the urban center: the rational function -which is also called the wisdom-loving role- the competitive part and the appetitive office. Each part of the soul has its corresponding function and its related virtue. The function of reason is to deliberate and determine what is convenient to the entire soul and each of its parts; the spirited or competitive office must defend in the soul the dictates of reason and the appetitive part must obey the ruling part. The correct performance of these parts produces wisdom, courage and temperance and the complete harmony of them is identified equally justice, the health of the soul. The goal of the legislator is to cultivate these iv central virtues both in each individual and in the state. The principal resource that the statesman has to achieve this goal is the teaching of citizens. Ii fields, as was traditionally proposed by the Greek cultures, mainly compose this instruction: gymnastics, on the one hand, and music and poetry, on the other (376e). The traditional educators understood that the kickoff one was established for the care of the body and the latter for the care of the soul. Nonetheless, according to the ideal proposal, all of them should be established in his Platonic Metropolis for the sake of the soul. On ane side, he claims, a lifelong physical preparation without music and verse causes the spirited part of the soul to become savage and tough and the wisdom-loving role enfeebled, deaf and blind and becomes a hater of reason and music. On the other side, music and poetry without gymnastics causes the spirited function of the soul to become soft and cowardly. On the contrary, when they are simultaneously cultivated "in order that these might be in harmony with one another, each beingness stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree" (411e), ane function becomes mettlesome and the other cultivated. (410c-411d) That is why Plato says: Being such the importance that Plato confers to music and poetry in the conformation of harmonious human souls; we tin can foresee that his critical approach to traditional poetry should not lead him to foreclose a space to these arts on his pedagogical proposalvii. Every bit Plato says, "it is in music and poetry that our guardians must build their bulwark" (424 c) I want to signal out another primal goal that the statesman should pursue through legislation and teaching. According to Plato, the most important quality that a denizen must accept and that in fact is the quality that allows united states to evaluate the quality of the soul of the citizens and determine who is going to exist guardian and even ruler is the respect and obedience to the constabulary. The educational activity of children from their early years must exist focused on this quality. Plato says that even the children'south games must be inspected so we tin can guarantee that they are law-abiding, for if the games become lawless and the children follow adapt, they are not going to grow as police force-abiding men. The same is true of poetry. Plato says that if we can absorb lawfulness from poetry, we can correct anything in the urban center that may take gone wrong earlier (424). Merely, on the contrary, when we allow lawlessness in poetry we tin face the destruction of the complete city. Plato says: So, with music and verse we have an instrument with two potential reverse results. When these arts are correctly performed, they are essential in the conformation of harmonious virtuous souls, manifested on courageous, cultivated and police force-abiding citizens. But when they are wrongly performed, they can cause the corruption of citizen's characters and on the long term the destruction of the state. That is why nosotros can see on the Republic simultaneously a hard critique to traditional poetry and a proposal for a poetry reform on the framework of the ideal pedagogical model. We are going to examine those two proposals in the following parts. The critique to imitative verse and the expulsion of the traditional Poets Let us begin with an assay of the platonic critique to the traditional imitative poetry, developed in the beginning of the book X of the Commonwealth. I want to advisedly analyze the 3 argumentations that Plato builds against the imitative poets in order to show that those critiques are not directed to qualities inherent to imitative poetry, but instead they are addressed to the classics poets themselves who, due to their ignorance, take developed a harmful kind of poesy. In that way, I desire to show that what must be expelled from the ideal metropolis is non the poetry itself but the poets and the work of poets that, co-ordinate to Plato, have been wrongly admired in the Greek Cultureviii. The showtime argumentation (595a-601a) is based upon the distinction of three degrees of reality. The first and highest degree, as nosotros can foresee, is the one of the intelligible beings, Platonic Ideas or Paradigms. The 2nd degree is the one of the sensible beings, the detail entities that we can perceive in our world. And the third degree is the one where we place the imitations that nosotros make of the sensible things. Plato offers an instance to illustrate this deviation. In the offset caste of reality we can locate the bed itself, the paradigm of bed according with which we telephone call bed to all things that resemble this Course. In the second degree, nosotros locate all the detail beds that accept been and will be manufactured. And in the third degree, we tin can place the painting of an creative person that tries to imitate the beds he sees in his world. What is important in here is to realize, that the work of the artist, says Plato, is an faux that he makes without knowing anything nigh the Paradigm of the bed, just he is only trying to imitate the works of craftsmen as they appear to him. So, he is an imitator, not of true simply of advent and what he produces is separated from reality in a third caste. The aforementioned happens with the works of poets, particularly of the tragedian. "He is past nature -Plato says- tertiary from the rex and the truth, as are all other imitators"; (597e) but their example is even worse, because those things their works are concerned about are the nigh important both for the constitution and for the private beings: they imitate all human diplomacy concerned with virtue and vice, and all the things related with gods every bit well (598d). Just let us terminate for a while and wonder whether it is bad in itself to produce something in this third degree of reality. If it were the case, Plato should expel from his city not only poesy, but also painting, sculpture and what is worst language itself. In fact, in his Letter VII Plato argues that the words that nosotros use to capture the first course of reality are also separated from information technology in this third degree. That is why at that place he says that the knowledge of reality cannot be correctly expressed past words, only unfortunately, our linguistic communication and our arts are past their very nature located in this tertiary degree of reality (Epis. Seven 341c-343d). At present, far from expelling completely this third grade of reality from the polis and to condemn all the citizens to an childlike and silent life, we have seen that Plato considers poetry together with music and gymnastics as the tools to educate harmonious virtuous souls. Well, then, what is exactly the problem of these works of faux that makes the imitative poetry so condemnable? Plato gave the answer to this question pointing out exactly what is the characteristic we have to carefully examine if nosotros want to rightly evaluate the works of a poet. With regard to those who say that they have encountered adept poets, he says these words: So the clue is to determine whether they accept produced their works based upon the knowledge of homo and divine affairs or out of ignorance, and of form the examination that follows these lines is completely devoted to show that classical poets exercise not have knowledge of human affairs; they know nix about human virtue and they do not have any idea near how to organize a urban center. The most important proof for that is that having this kind of knowledge would have allowed them to be good educators of their fellow citizens improving their ways of life; they would have been able to propose practiced political legislation as Lycurgus did; their cities could have won a war under their instruction. Notwithstanding, the fact is that none of these things happened (599 c-d). So we can confidently conclude that they actually did non write the poetry based upon knowledge of human affairs, only they only imitate appearances. And what is worst those are false appearances that produce wrong ideas of what virtue is actually like. At present, to solve the problems of imitative poetry nosotros could undertake two strategies: we can expel all those poets who produce their works out of ignorance but we can as well commend wise people, with real knowledge of human and divine affairs, to write renovated verse which imitate actually virtuous actions and which correctly represents the nature of gods. That is exactly the proposal we notice in the Laws with the creation of the Elder's chorus (Leg. 664c), equanimous past men betwixt thirty and 60 years who must know three things: the nature of what has been represented, how correctly it has been copied and the moral value of the representation produced by language, tunes and rhythms (Leg. 669a-b)9; but that is also what nosotros notice in the books II and Iii of the Commonwealth, as we are going to examine in the third part of this paper. Let us now move to the second argumentation against the classical imitative poetry (601d-602c). This i is based upon the distinction betwixt three kinds of arts: the fine art that uses an object, the art that produces information technology and the ane that imitates it (601d). The example Plato gave to illustrate this stardom is related with the flute: one is the flautist' art, other the art of the flute-maker, and other the one of a painter who draws a flute. The first is the one who has more experience well-nigh the object and is the one who understand the virtue of that thing in equally much as the virtue of each manufactured item, each living creature and each action is related to its natural use (601d). On the other hand, the maker does not have knowledge, as the flautist does, only only right opinion near whether something he makes is fine or bad, by receiving instructions from a user who knows (601e); simply the painter does not take cognition nor correct opinion virtually the virtue or vice of the things he is painting (602 a). The same thing happens with the imitative poet. They do not have knowledge of homo virtue nor right opinion about how to produce information technology. "Even so -Plato says-, he'll go along imitating, even though he doesn't know the good or bad qualities of annihilation [...] but what he'll imitate, it seems, is what appears fine or cute to the majority of people who know nothing" (602a-b). That is why classical imitative poets easily deceive the bulk of people. Simply over again, nosotros should discover that this critique is directed towards the poets rather than to the imitative poetry itself. We can imagine without contradiction a painter of a flute who is simultaneously a flautist. In the same way, we can imagine an imitative poet who is simultaneously wise near human virtue.10 This poet would be able to imitate not the false appearances shared by the majority of people who is incorrect about virtue, but to imitate the right and essential characteristics of a virtuous human existence.eleven The third argumentation (602c-607a) is concerned with the event that imitative poetry produces in the human soul. Allow us remember that the ideal soul is divided into three parts: the rational, the appetitive and the competitive part, and that Plato says that in a healthy human soul each part must be devoted to accomplish its own function and should not overpass it. In that way, we said, a virtuous human soul is one where reason commands the entire soul and the other parts obeys and defends the instructions of reason. The biggest risk of imitative verse is that it contributes to break the harmony of the soul, encouraging the lower parts of the soul to disobey the dictates of reason. To explicate this thesis Plato focuses in one typical scene that we can observe in tragic poetry. Frequently nosotros tin see the hero, the poetic model of a virtuous man, crying, beating his chest, and loudly lamenting the expiry of his beloveds. But all of them are deportment that we consider in fact contrary to the virtuous person, who must cultivate his endurance, recover quickly from his suffering and be able to master his grief. For this reason Plato says: Thus, the problem of this relaxation of reason when information technology contemplates the tragic performance is that it allows the nourishment and strengthening of the everyman parts of the soul. This in turn makes us less able to endure our own sufferings. The same happens with all the other aspects of our life: sex, anger, pleasance, pain are also misrepresented in such a way that the hero is pictured as beingness mastered by them and non by reason (606d). Thank you to that, tragic poesy causes the opposite outcome that didactics is trying to establish in all those aspects of our life: that reason loses its power in the human soul and becomes the slave of the lower parts. But again, we tin can see that Plato'southward critique is not directed to poetry itself, only to the ignorance of the poets. If nosotros find a wise poet, able to sympathise the real nature of human virtuous actions, we can commend him to write a renovated poesy with the confidence that he will non picture the hero performing all kinds of shameful actions, merely doing exactly those actions that are truly virtuous. Now, Plato envisages this option, but he recognizes that the representation of that kind of moderate virtuous man will not cause the general audition any pleasure. To the entire contrary, they are not going to be able to sympathise the behavior of this character, they are going to be bored and they are going to consider that the poet is an incompetent one (604e-605a)12. Still, does it mean that we accept to renounce to the idea of a renovated imitative poetry? I think that the platonic answer to this question is negative and the reason for that is that he believes that the fundamental office of education is to teach people from their very childhood to feel pleasure in the right things and pain in the incorrect things, to love what should be loved and to hate what should be hated (Leg. 653a). In consequence, the fact that the bulk of bad educated citizens do non feel pleasure in this kind of virtuous performance does not mean that through teaching we cannot teach children and hereafter adults to feel pleasure in the imitation of real virtuous actions (Leg. 659e). Now, the imitation of these actually virtuous actions could have the contrary effect to that caused by the traditional imitative verse both in the actors and in the spectators. It could habituate us to see and to perform virtuous actions in such a way that on the long term information technology could smooth the performing of virtuous actions. To stop this section, I desire to quote an invitation that Plato extends after his devastating critique to classical imitative poesy. Every bit I take already mentioned, although classical poets could not exist defended because their works are written out of ignorance, a renovated imitative and pleasant poetry based upon knowledge of human being and divine affairs could be written and could be beneficial for human souls and for the state. In the next section I want to focus on the books Ii and Iii (376e-403c) of the Republic to evidence that the reform of poesy that he proposes there matches perfectly well this idea. The platonic reform of poetry Plato, who confesses to be a lover of poetry, undertakes the work of explaining in prose how poetry and music could exist accordingly used as means to educate the guardians of his ideal city. To do that he distinguishes three aspects that should exist analyzed: (i) the content of the stories, what must exist said; (ii) the manner, how it must be said, and (iii) what modes and rhythms should back-trail the stories. I volition focus on the content and the style, for that will allow me to show how his proposal matches perfectly well with his invitation and escapes exactly those critiques he fabricated to the traditional poets. Let us start with the content of the stories (λ?γοι). The first affair to exercise, he says, is to review the already written stories and so: But a 2d footstep to undertake, according to Plato, is to "lodge the poets to compose the opposite kind of verse and tell the reverse kind of tales" (392 a-b). When nosotros review the patterns that Plato found to select and write these stories, we see that what he has in mind is that poetry should exist written based upon real knowledge of human and divine affairs, in such a manner that it does not requite us a faux image of how heroes and gods are like. The reason for that, of course, is that only in that mode we tin can promote pious and virtuous behavior in our citizens. I will briefly present a synthesis of these patterns: • Laws or Patterns for stories about the gods: Whether in epic, lyric or tragedy, a god must always be represented as he is: (379a) (i) god is really good and is the cause only of good things, (ii) gods are non sorcerers who change their appearance to deceive usa, nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deeds. The stories of gods should likewise exist written in lodge to promote virtue. In that manner, to stimulate courage: (3) they should not represent the life in Hades as something terrifying, since that is neither true nor beneficial for future warriors who must exist afraid more of slavery than of decease, (387b) and to stimulate moderation: so that citizens obey the rulers, and govern the pleasures of drink, sex and food (389d), (four) they should not tell stories of immoderate behavior of gods, for all citizens will be set up to excuse their immoderate beliefs pointing out that gods and their shut descendants act this way (391e). • Laws or Patterns for stories about human beings: The stories should provide a correct idea about the behavior of a truly virtuous man: So (i) we should delete the lamentations ant pitiful speeches of decent men as Achilles and Priam, leave them to bad women and cowardly men, because in that way men are going to be able to give fashion to lamentations and bear misfortune almost quietly when it strike (387e). "Merely if, one the other mitt, there are words or deeds of famous men, who are exhibiting endurance in the face of everything, surely they must exist seen or heard" (390c-d). (2) Nosotros should prohibit the representation of unjust people as happy, or of the just people every bit wretched. (iii) In the same manner, we should banish the idea that injustice is profitable if information technology escapes detection, and that justice is another's good simply one's loss. We tin see that all these patterns are focused on the idea of disseminating a true formulation of gods and virtue that promotes in the citizens a pious and virtuous beliefs. I also want to present a possibility that Plato envisages in the Republic. Sometimes in our private life it is useful to create false stories to aid a friend to avert acting bad out of ignorance or madness (382 c-d). In the same way, sometimes it would exist useful to create false stories or to hibernate truthful stories in club to promote good behavior in citizens. The product of this falsehood, says Plato, should simply be allowed to the rulers. "But anybody else must go on away from them, because for a private citizen to prevarication to a ruler is merely as bad a mistake as for a sick person or athlete not to tell the truth to his dr. or trainer" (398b-c). The reason why I want to underlie this possibility is that it shows clearly that the chief goal of Plato is to embrace virtuous behavior and the truth is only the most expedient mean to information technology. That implies that when we tin can achieve this goal by other means we tin sacrifice the truth. That is a inkling to defend that what Plato considers undesirable of classical poetry is not that it is placed in the tertiary grade of reality and truth, but that it promotes vicious behavior. We have already talked nearly what should be said in poetry; let u.s.a. move to talk about how it should exist said, I mean, the style. Plato distinguishes iii kinds of fashion (λ?ξεις): • Narrative lonely: The poet himself is speaking and doesn't endeavour to get us to recall that the speaker is someone other than himself (e.g. dithyrambs). (393a) • Narrative through imitation: The poet speaks as if he were someone else. "To make oneself like someone else in vocalism or appearance is to imitate the person one makes oneself like". That is why this is called 'narrative through simulated' (e.g. tragedy and comedy). (393c) • Narrative alone plus narrative through imitation: Combines the ii former kinds of narrative (due east.g. ballsy poetry). Plato wonders whether nosotros are going to allow poets to imitate something or are they not going to exist immune to imitate anything at all? Plato gave two answers to this question. In the first ane, he remembered that in his ideal city information technology is not appropriate for a citizen to play many unlike roles, only each person should be focused on performing just the specific role that has been assigned to him. The guardian, claims Plato, should exist single-minded. For this reason, it would be absurd to imagine him imitating many dissimilar kinds of entities, characters and occupations (395b-c). This statement would seem to ban the possibility to perform any kind of imitation. However, as Sergio Ariza rightly points out, this argument only shows that the citizen should not imitate a broad telescopic of things, but he should focus on imitating the actions of a virtuous human13, which in the long term is a style of performing his own role on society. 14 In that way, this argument leaves open up the possibility to defend an imitative poetry that incorporates the false of virtuous agents. The second answer Plato gave to the question about the kind of λ?ξεις that should exist authorized to poets was that the style of poesy should be a combination of purely narrative and narrative through imitation; and of grade, the actions that guardians are immune to imitate are virtuous actions and the reason is that those imitations are going to contribute to their virtuous moral habituation. He says: This platonic thesis also allows united states of america to reinforce our estimation of the tertiary platonic critique confronting the traditional imitative poesy. This fine art, we can say, does non by itself cause a negative effect in the human soul reinforcing the disobedience of the lower parts to reason. On the contrary, poetry equanimous out of cognition of what virtue is, can habituate usa from childhood through imitation to human activity virtuously and on the long term to be virtuous.fifteen Run across also this passage, which allows faux not only to children, but also to adult persons already virtuous: So then, we should wonder why Plato wrote the following strong lines as the decision of his critique to imitative poetry in the book x of the Republic? And also: As I have tried to defend, the critiques of Plato are non directed to the imitative poetry itself, but are focused more in the fact that the current poets are ignorant of what virtue is in the first degree of reality and, thus, their imitations are only copies of simulated appearances of what seems to be virtuous to the majority of people. In that way, passages like the 2 formers are simply Plato'south ways to emphasize that all traditional imitative poetry have committed big mistakes. Withal, as Tate says, there could be a genuine artist and a true and beautiful verse. "Such art volition exist an false or expression of the reality of truth and beauty. But information technology would announced that in Plato'south view no extant poetry belonged to this course. The ideal state must in its own interests phone call a new race of poets into being" (Tate 1928: 22).18 Plato finishes his research of the way poetry volition be used to educate the citizens of his ideal city analyzing the modes and rhythms that should accompany the stories. I won't focus on this point, because that will movement me abroad from my argumentation, merely I do want to point out that the conclusion of this assay is that modes and rhythms should imitate the courageous and moderate men (400d)19, and that this is important for Plato considering "rhythm and harmony permeate the inner role of the soul more than anything else" (401 d). In this way, those non-cognitive elements of poetry play an important role in molding a harmonious soul, making the lower office of the soul gentle, malleable and more than obedient to reason. That is i motive more to preserve a renovated verse in the ideal metropolis. I desire to finish this paper past pointing out that the political goal of molding virtuous citizens through education moves Plato not only to propose a reform of poetry, simply too to come through with a reform of all the arts and crafts. In fact, he says, we should not allow the representation of vicious deportment neither in paintings, buildings, sculptures nor even woven in embroideries. If we allow any of these, they are going to slowly corrupt the soul of our citizens merely if we pay careful attention to all of them, we can use all these things to reach the means of the polis, namely, the happiness of all citizenstwenty. Of form, this well-intentioned proposal leads united states of america to question how are nosotros going to achieve happiness without creating a completely totalitarian regimen. That is a question for a different investigation. Footnotes 1. Encounter Gilbert 1939: 4; Asmis 1992: 338-339; Nussbaum 1995: 183-192 and Puchner 2010: 3-9 (some of them quoted past Castillo 2016: 39). 2. Meet Greene 1918: 54; Annas 1981; Nehamas 1982. three. Gilbert argues that Plato was not trying to expel the poets from his ideal urban center, merely "he was fighting a mistaken practical view of the nature and role of poetry" (Gilbert 1939: 9). After his analysis he concludes: "it is now possible to believe that he was not attacking his beloved Homer and the rest of the tragic visitor, merely rather rescuing them from the ignorant [...] Plato attempted to banish the bad critics that the poets might appear as they truly were and are, even if only to the fit audience who tin discern their nature as artists" (Gilbert 1939: 19). iv. Ariza argues that Plato did non desire to expel the classical imitative poets, merely the imitative mode itself (Ariza 2009). Ordónez claims that platonic critique to imitative poetry expels all kind of mimetic poetry, preserving only hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people, which, according to his estimation, practise not include imitation (Ordóñez 2012). five. Tate establishes a distinction between good and bad imitation, which is based upon the distinction between two kinds of poets: the ignorant and the aware (Tate 1928 and 1931). Asmis considers that Plato allows the verse that preserves only the imitation of virtuous actions and precludes the "all-imitative poetry" (Asmis 1992). See likewise Belfiore 1974; Halliwell 2002 and White 1979 (some of them quoted past Castillo 2016: 38). 6. All translations come from Cooper'south edition. Following Heather Reid suggestion, I adopt to translate γυμναστικ? past gymnastics than concrete training, as Cooper does. The reason, as I have mentioned, is that they are established for the sake of the soul. 7. In this point, I completely reject the interpretation of Gilbert, who says: "If Plato had planned Greek pedagogy he would accept cutting down the corporeality of attempt spent on the poets; certainly he would have eliminated all that role dependent on its supposed immediate practical value" (Gilbert 1939: xiii). 8. Ariza (2009) defends the opposite thesis: Platonic censorship is not concerned with contents or particular poets, merely is directed to the poetical forms themselves. 9. See as well Leg. 829 c-east, and Gilbert's commentary to these lines. He considers Plato's proposal of a Chorus of wise but not very talented elders as an expression of Plato's utilise of irony (Gilbert 1939: 8). On the contrary, I think that he is very committed with this proposal. 10. Ordóñez claims: "the creator of images, which is first and foremost imitator mimetés) knows nearly what appears to him -for access to the truth is banded-, never about what is" (Ordóñez 2012: 144. The translation is mine). I do not hold with this thought, because I practice not run across whatsoever reason to claim that the access to the truth is banded to people who are likewise able to produce something in the 3rd degree of reality. 11. Tate's distinction between skilful and bad imitation is based upon this difference between a poet who knows the essence or the Paradigms of Justice, Beauty, etcetera and is trying to reproduce those forms through his art and a false poet who but follows perceptual appearances (cf. Tate 1932: 162 - 163; run into also Bourgault 2012: 67). In this indicate I follow Tate'south interpretation completely. However, he goes on claiming that this artist'southward poems are only once removed from the ideas and not twice removed (Tate 1932: 165). I am not convinced with this office of his interpretation, because the poems themselves -although they are composed out of cognition of the Epitome of Virtue and, in consequence, of the essential characteristics of particular virtuous actions- could not be classified in the 2nd degree of reality where we place sensible beings. Imitations are placed in a different ontological level than sensible beings. Of course, these men could be able to create magnificent virtuous deportment, persons or cities in the second level of reality cheers to their knowledge of the Paradigm of Virtue. However, in as much as they create this kind of entities they are no longer poets, only citizens, educators or politicians. Asmis also reflects about the possibility of a poet who knows the Paradigms. But she says that being able to produce goodness in this world, the poet "would not devote himself to making "semblances" of goodness" (Asmis 1992: 353). He would exist a creator of actual goodness in homo beings. For this reason she prefers to claim that the poet does not take cognition of the forms, but only receives correct behavior from lawgivers in order to create his poems. Now, she says, "having correct beliefs, the poet is raised to the level of a craftsman, similar the carpenter, the determent maker, and all the other nonphilosophical craftsmen in the new urban center. Like the residuum, the poet has the position of serving the lawgiver. Instead of imitating humans as they are or appear to be, he creates images of humans as they should be, by taking directions from the lawgiver, who looks toward the Forms." (Asmis 1992: 358). Again, on the i hand, I think that the mere knowledge or right opinion would not move the poems to a different ontological level. But, if the poet decides to create entities in the second level of reality they would practice that not as poet, but every bit citizen, politician or educator. On the other hand, having the possibility to create entities in both levels of reality, I do not think that a person should reject to create entities in the third degree of reality, given the pedagogical importance of poesy. 12. Based upon this commentary, Ariza claims that an imitation should run across some internal requirements in order to be considered a good fake: the actors should exist able to agitate emotions, create suspense, etc. Ariza says that nosotros can perform sober representations of calm men, merely they are non going to exist skilful representations. Mímesis follows its own aesthetic rules, establishes autonomously, independently of moral and philosophical criteria, what counts as a good or bad imitation. This autonomy, he believes, is the reason why imitation and imitative poetry should be expelled from the ideal city. On the contrary, the purely narrative style does not have its own internal rules to make up one's mind what counts equally a skilful narration. Its value tin can exist determined based upon moral standards. That is why narration, he says, could be preserved in a reformatted way in the ideal city. (Ariza 2009: xix) I do non concord with this estimation. No matter how interesting the idea of the autonomy of the mimetic art could be for a modern reader, it is clear that Plato considers that the aesthetic emotions that comes with the observation of a functioning does not depend just and non even mainly on the internal qualities of this performance, but depend on our character, shaped by the way we were brought up to feel pleasure or pain against the appropriate or the inappropriate things (655c-659e). And of course, this education could be evaluated under moral standards. This idea is emphasized by Plato on the Laws, where he says that the real quality of an artistic performance could non exist evaluated by the mass of uneducated people, but should be evaluated by the wise man who understand the right moral values and can evaluate whether they have been well or bad represented forth the performance. An artist sings and dances well, Plato says, if he sings good songs and dances good dances. Too, a song and a dance are good when they represent the actions of virtuous people (run into Leg. 659a-d; Leg. 654b and 655b). xiii. Cf. Ariza 2009: 16; see also Castillo 2016: 48. 14. Tate says that "the guardians who practice information technology [the imitation of virtuous men] will be imitating their own platonic graphic symbol, not characters utterly conflicting from their own. Information technology involves not the suppression but the development of the personality." (Tate 1928: 17-18) In that mode, this poet will not loose the single-mindedness, which must characterize the guardian. But, Tate insists, this merely will exist true under the post-obit condition: "Not but should the model exist, as a rule, good; the of import betoken is that the poet must himself be good, and empathize the principles of goodness" (Tate 1928: eighteen) This is very important for Tate, because he believes that the poetry expelled from the ideal polis "is that of the unworthy poet who is always putting on a character alien to his own" (Tate 1928: nineteen). 15. This thought allows me to defend that imitation of virtuous actions should not be immune simply to already virtuous agents but also to children and young people guided past the elder ones who can teach them which are the actions whose imitation could contribute to their moral habituation. This is coherent with the platonic idea of instruction as an early habituation of children in pleasure and pains through the correct actions, that should exist latter harmonized with reason, which recognizes why this behavior is correct. Consummate virtue, the goal of instruction and polis, is defined as the concord of reason and emotion (Leg. 653b). The poet himself, however, could only be the wise and virtuous elder. 16. These lines have been the turning point betwixt the interpreters of Plato. As I take mentioned on the introduction, some accept argued that while books II and 3 allowed the imitation of the deportment of virtuous men, Volume X excluded the possibility of all kinds of imitation. Thus, they contend that there is a clash betwixt the theses of these books. Others take argued that there is no conflict between them and have mentioned that in these lines the word "imitative" ways "indiscriminately imitative", so that what Plato would have been saying is that he has excluded the poetry that imitates all types of entities and actions, including barbarous actions (cf. Belfiore, Ferrari and Menza, quoted by Asmis 1992: 363 n 27). 17. Ordóñez emphasizes these lines and argues that in the platonic city we are going to expel all kind of faux and we will preserve only hymns to the gods and eulogies to virtuous people in the context of festivities, games and sacrifices, considering all these cultural, sporting and religious events are linked to rituals, and rituals crave poetry (cf. Ordóñez 2012: 150). But these rituals are likewise linked with the mimetic functioning in the Greek tradition (For a farther evolution of this link meet Castillo 2016: 37 n.3). Furthermore, Tate argues that Plato himself regarded hymns to the gods and eulogies of skillful men every bit imitative poesy (cf. Tate 1932: 161; see also Asmis 1992: 351). He says "I see no reason why these hymns and eulogies should not comprise those forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to the ideal poet in 396. Such a poet may imitate good men like himself (cf. Tate 1932: 167). xviii. Thus information technology seems rather strange to consider Plato equally a conservative philosopher of music and verse and not as a reformist. Bourgault reports as advocates of this conservative epitome of Plato to Moutsopoulos, Terry Saunders, R. F. Stalley, James Urmson; and argues confronting them. (Bourgault 2012: 59-60 and 67-68). 19. Bourgault emphasizes that rhythm and harmony have this capacity to imitate moral character, and its importance for developing in children "correct emotional habits-training them to experience pleasure for the right things, at the right time, in the right corporeality". And she says "This is worth emphasizing because when nosotros argue near the necessity of music censorship today, we tend to consider only the impairment done by offensive language. Rarely do we hear arguments to the effect that certain rhythmic patterns or modes could equally affect the mental health of children (and this might very well be something for us to ponder)" (Bourgault 2012: 62). 20. For a further evolution of this idea see Asmis 1992: 349. References Annas, J. (1981). An introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Printing. [ Links ] Ariza, Due south. (2009). Desterrando formas poéticas en la República de Platón. Revista de Estudios Sociales, 34, 13-23. [ Links ] Asmis, E. (1992). Plato on poetic creativity. R. Kraut (Ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato (pp. 338-364). Cambridge, USA: Loving cup. [ Links ] Belfiore, E. (1984). A Theory of Fake in Plato'southward Republic. Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974), 114, 121-146. Recovered 15/11/2016 http://world wide web.jstor.org/stable/284143?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [ Links ] Bourgault, Due south. (2012). Music and Instruction in the Platonic City. Periodical of Aesthetic Education, 46(1), 59-72. [http://doi.org.ezproxy.unal.edu.co/10.5406/jaesteduc.46.1.0059] [ Links ] . Gilbert, A. H. (1939). Did Plato Blackball the Poets or the Critics? Studies in Philology, 36(one), one-19. Retrieved xv/11/2016 http://world wide web.jstor.org.ezproxy.unal.edu.co/stable/4172425 [ Links ] Greene, W. C. (1918). Plato's View of Poetry. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 29, one-75. [http://doi.org.ezproxy.unal.edu.co/10.2307/310558] [ Links ] . Halliwell, Due south. (2002). The aesthethics of mímesis. Ancient texts and moder problems. Princenton, USA: PUP (pp. 38-39). [ Links ] Havelock, Eastward. (1963). Preface to Plato. Harvard, USA: Harvard University Press. [ Links ] Nehamas, A. (1982). Plato on False and Verse in Commonwealth X. En, J. Moravssik & P. Temko (Eds). Plato on Dazzler, Wisdom and the Arts. (pp. 47-78). Totowa, USA: Rowman and Littlefield. [ Links ] Ordóñez, Five. (2012). El lugar de la tragedia y la comedia en el Estado Platónico. Revista Internacional de filosofía, 55, 143-156. [ Links ] Plato, & Cooper, J. (Ed.). (1997). Laws (Trans. Saunders, T.). Consummate Works. Indianapolis, Us: Hackett. [ Links ] Plato, & Cooper, J. (Ed.). (1997). Letters (Trans. Morrow, G. R.). Consummate Works. Indianapolis, Us: Hackett. [Epis. [ Links ] ] Plato, & Cooper, J. (Ed.). (1997). Republic. (Trans. G.M.A., Grube). Complete Works. Indianapolis, USA: Hackett. [ Links ] Tate, J. (1928). 'Faux' in Plato'due south Republic. The Classical Quarterly, 22(1), sixteen-23. Retrieved 15/11/2016 http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.unal.edu.co/stable/63593 [ Links ] Tate, J. (1932). Plato and 'False'. The Classical Quarterly, 26(3/four), 161-169. Retrieved 16/eleven/2016 http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.unal.edu.co/stable/636756 [ Links ] White, N. (1979). A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis, The states: Hackett Publishing. [ Links ]
Desde el 2010 es profesora del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad del Valle y directora e investigadora del Grupo Ágora: diálogo entre antiguos y modernos, Cali, Republic of colombia. Realizó sus estudios en filosofía en la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, de la que se graduó con honores en el año 2004. Posteriormente realizó allí su Doctorado en Filosofía desarrollando una investigación sobre las relaciones entre el destino y la responsabilidad en el estoicismo antiguo en la cual obtuvo en el 2009 la calificación "laureada". Su campo de investigación son las teorías clásicas de la formación moral, el determinismo y la responsabilidad.
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Aprobado: junio 21 de 2016
And isn't it, as nosotros were saying, a mixture of music and poetry, on the one hand, and gymnastics, on the other, that makes the 2 parts harmonious, stretching and nurturing the rational function with fine words and learning, rela- xing the other part through soothing stories, and making information technology gentle by ways of harmony and rhythm? (441e)half dozen
"Those in charge must cling to education and see that it isn't corrupted wi- thout their noticing it, guarding it against everything. Above all, they must baby-sit as advisedly as they can against any innovation in music and verse or in gymnastics that is counter to the established gild. [...] The guardians must beware of changing to a new class of music, since information technology threatens the wholes organisation. As Damon says, and I am convinced, the musical modes are never changed without modify in the near important of a city'south laws. [...] When lawlessness has established itself there [in music and poetry], information technology flows over trivial and fiddling into characters and ways of life. Then, greatly increased, it steps out into private contracts, and from private contracts, Socrates, information technology makes its insolent fashion into laws and authorities, until in the end it overthrows everything, public and private" (424 b-d)
Hence, nosotros have to look to see whether those who tell u.s.a. this have encoun- tered these imitators and have been then deceived by them that they don't rea- lize that their works are the tertiary remove from that which is and are hands produced without noesis of the truth (since they are only images, not things that are), or whether there is something in what these people say, and good poets really practice have knowledge of the things most people remember they write and then well most. (598e-599a)
[...] the part that is forcibly controlled in our private misfortunes [...] is the very part that receives satisfaction and enjoyment from poets, and [...] the part of ourselves that is best by nature, since information technology hasn't been adequately educated either by reason or by addiction, relaxes its guard over the lamenting office when it is watching the suffering of somebody else. [...] I suppose that only a few are able to figure information technology out that enjoyment of other people'due south suffe- rings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others, won't exist hands held in check when nosotros ourselves suffer. (606 a-b)
If the poesy that aims at pleasance and imitation has any argument to bring forrard that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed metropolis, we at least would exist glad to acknowledge it, for we are well aware of the charm it exercises. [...] Then nosotros'll allow its defenders, who aren't poet themselves but lovers of poetry, to speak in prose on its behalf and to show that it not only gives pleasure but is beneficial both to constitutions and to human life. (607c-d)
[...] select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren't. And we'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell their chil- dren the 1 that we have selected, since they will shape their children's souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by handling them. Many of the stories they tell now, however, must be thrown out. (377b-c)
If they [the guardians] do imitate, they must imitate from babyhood what is advisable for them, namely, people who are mettlesome, self-contro- lled, pious, and free, and their actions. They mustn't be clever at doing or imitating slavish or shameful actions, lest from enjoying the imitation, they come up to enjoy the reality. Or haven't y'all noticed that imitations skilful from youth become office of nature and settle into habits of gesture, vox, and thought? (395c-d)
"When a moderate man comes upon the words or actions of a good man in his narrative, he'll be willing to report them equally if he were that human him- self, and he won't be aback of that kind of false. He'll imitate this expert human most when he'due south interim in a faultless and intelligent manner, just he'll do so less, and with more reluctance, when the expert human is upset in disease, sexual passion, drunkenness, or some other misfortune. When he comes to a character unworthy of himself, however, he'll be unwilling to brand himself seriously resemble the inferior grapheme -except maybe for a brief period in which he'southward doing something good." (396c-d).
Nosotros didn't admit whatsoever that is imitative. Now [...] information technology is even clearer, I think, that such poetry should be altogether excluded. (595a)xvi
You should also know that hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people are the simply verse we tin can admit into our urban center.17 If y'all admit the pleasu- re-giving Muse, whether in lyric or Ballsy poetry, pleasure and pains will be the kings in your city instead of law or the thing that everyone has always believed to be best, namely, reason. (607a)
Castillo, K. (2016). A través del espejo y lo que Platón encontró allí. Mímesis entre lógos y alétheia. Praxis filosófica Nueva serie, (42), 33-58. [ Links ]
Praxis Filosófica cuenta con una licencia Artistic Eatables "reconocimiento, no comercial y sin obras derivadas 2.v Republic of colombia"
Source: http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0120-46882016000200003
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